THE STRUCTURE OF THE
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
STEVE NICKESON*

The Bureau of Indian Affairs has always had a militant disinclination toward change. It is like Mother Nature: it can be probed, occupied, undermined, or incinerated, but its essence always seems to remain immutable, its
form determined more by the composite debris of passing careers than by
directed action. Any efforts to encourage basic change become the feckless
hobbies of frustrated men.
Like most bureaucracies, the BIA frequently gives a superficial appearance
of change while moving to preserve its existing structure. An excellent illustration of this process was provided early in this decade, when the BIA
agreed that the federally recognized tribes should have 20 per cent of the influence over the Bureau's budget formulating process. Tribal officials were
given an approximation of how much money would be available on their reservations, and they drafted budgets that reflected local priorities from
among the Bureau's five program areas: Education, Indian Services, Reservation Resource Development, Trust Responsibilities and Services, and
Administration. The tribes' imput was first blended with the federal government's 80 per cent control to create the FY 1974 budget, which was not questioned. But the next year the tribal representatives compared their own priorities with the amounts the BIA had budgeted for each program area and
it was clear that the two did not mesh.
The evidence was on two graphs. The first graph showed program sizes
and projected growth rates of the Bureau's approved FY 1975 budget. The
second one did the same for a set of figures that a computer analysis indicated would have been the 1975 budget had the Bureau honestly given the
tribes 20 per cent control.
On the first graph Education was the largest, fastest growing Bureau expenditure. Indian Services was second in size and rate of growth. Reservation
Resource Development was small and growing slowly. Trust Responsibilities
and Services was one-tenth the size of Education and was not growing at all.
Management (fixed administrative costs) was of moderate size and growth.
But on the second graph, the one that reflected 20 per cent tribal input,
Education was tapering off into a slow-growing, low priority program. Indian
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Services once again followed Education's rate, but was slightly larger. Reservation Resource Development was taking a drastic jump upward to overshadow
the first two areas. Trust Responsibilities and Services was climbing vertically
from the bottom to become the largest Bureau expenditure. And Management was continuing its moderate way.
In short, the Bureau had thrown the tribal input away because it pointed
in the direction of unrestricted trust protection and economic self-sufficiency
instead of supporting the Bureau's policies of off-reservation education and
the maintenance of reservations as welfare states.
When the findings were displayed and explained during a national
conference,1 the reaction was a subdued acknowledgement that business was
usual at the Bureau. Chalk up another lie, another reason for loving to hate,
additional proof for whatever theory one has for making reason out of what
appears as federal madness. But none of these theories-the BIA as a racist
conspiracy, or a colonial office, or a black hole in space-explains the budget
sharing lie as well as the simple notion that the tribes had attacked the
Bureau's entire organizational and policy structure. For the Bureau to have
turned over to the tribes control of a significant proportion of the budget
-particularly in the area of education 2-would have been to revolutionize the
entrenched bureaucracy that has grown up in support of a policy aimed at
bringing Native Americans in line culturally and economically with the majority population.
The budget sharing proposal is only one of a host of programs that has
sought directly or indirectly to restructure the relations between the BIA and
the Indians. As the central administrative agency for federal Indian policy,
the BIA has an immense impact on the daily lives of reservation Indians. To
understand the possible impact of new proposals one must consider two centuries of policy structure and the power of all those who have a vested
interest-professionally, personally, or ideologically-in maintaining the present system. To confront change realistically, one must consider the true structure of the Bureau; one must consider policy and the power that it generates.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs has several structures. One is visible, the
rest are nonetheless real. The visible one is represented in the Bureau's mercurial organization manual and flow chart. These documents are dependable
for mapping the advance of paperwork and naming offices, but beyond that
they can be misleading because they show little more than a thin, single dimension of an organization that does not always work according to its
schematic design. It could only do so if the Bureau were a mass of managerial
theory bound by inflexible rules instead of a mass of human beings bound by
1. National Conference on Tibal Policy, Washington, D.C., June 5-6, 1974.
2. The education budget for FY 1976 is $230 million, while the budget for trust responsibilities is $21 million.

Page 61: Winter 1976]

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

regulations, politics, loyalties, fears,'ideals, and ambitions.
At present the flow chart shows power percolating down from the Conmissioner and Deputy Commissioner through the Central Office staff' and the
Area Offices to the Agency Offices. The basic Central/Area/Agency structure
is a generation old, and was arrived at, like many things in the Bureau, by
legislation that justified and organized past practice.
Just as the aged sometimes resemble themselves in childhood, so too the
Bureau's three-tiered structure resembles its early organization. At its birth in
1824 the Bureau consisted of a Commissioner linked directly to the Indian
Agents in the field. For ease of administration, regional Superintendents were
later placed between the two. As the Bureau expanded during the Allotment
period, the Indian Agent became an Agency Superintendent and the old regional superintendent network formed the basis of a new structure for administrative officers. As Indian programs proliferated at the turn of the century, separate regional systems developed for each of them. By the time
Laurence Schmickebier completed his inspection of the Bureau in 1927, separate regional structures existed for health, irrigation, administration, and edlucation, and the agency superintendents were reporting directly to the Central
Office.' This visible structure had grown helter-skelter and did not squa re
with the fundamental bureaucratic need for efficiency and uniformity of action. It took twenty years from the publication of Schmickebier's stuIy to
harmonize the discord into the Central/Area/Agency arrangement, a strucut re
John Collier had proposed in the 1930s as a way of' aiding the transfer of
power from \Vashington, D.C. to the reservation. The transfer stopped, however, the instant the Area Offices realized they were not simply intermediaries,
but the heads of miniature Central Offices capable of controlling communication between Central and Agency, and back again. Naturally political alliances
formed along the lines of communication, and in no time the Area Offices
became the frontier checkpoints for those going in or out of indian Country.
One definition of a bureaucracy says it is "always a government of experts,
of an 'experienced minority.- 4 The Bureau makes that observation a cliche,
and the Bureau's most experienced minority are the Area Office Directors.
They are the only personnel who have as much daily contact with the reservations as they do with the Central Offices;

they know the

politics, the

strengths and weaknesses, and the prices of each one. They also have the
cohesion, the pay grade, the line authority, the friends in Congress, and organized pressure groups to make the system conform to their expectations.
The\, have several distinct advantages over anyone in the Central Office, not
to mention their subordinates in the Agencies.
3. L. SCHMICKE BIER. STRUCI URE OF ITHE BIA (1927); see especially the appendix on locations
of Bureau installations.
4. H. ARENDI, ORIGINS OF TOTALIFARIANiSM 214 (1951).
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In theory most of the Bureau's power is in the Central Office because it is
delegated there broadly by Congress and specifically by the Secretary of Interior; from Central it is to be delegated on down the chart. But delegated
power is controlled by those who delegate it: it is visible and the actions it
precipitates are constantly monitored by the Administration, Congress, the
press, and the major Indian organizations. But the Area Offices are not always subject to that kind of scrutiny and the powers delegated to them can be
exercised with greater impunity. The power to play favorites, to meddle in
tribal politics, to obscure issues or decide matters not covered in the manual
are largely invisible powers. And the less they are seen the more arbitrary and
absolute they can become. They are powers the Area Officials had successfully fought to maintain for many years, and they were secure with that
power when Robert Bennett left office as Commissioner of Indian Affairs in
1969. But their past struggles were minor compared to the one that began
after Bennett's departure. It is a story that provides more information on the
Bureau and its structure than any organizational manual, flow chart, or
5
anatomical exploration.
The first warning of battle came in the fall of 1969 when Louis Bruce, on
assuming the duties of Commissioner, announced that his administration
would be opposed to the policy of terminating the special status of Indian
tribes. It is ironic that such a pronouncement would bode any disastrous consequences because termination had long since been discredited and few if any
in the Bureau paid it tribute. In fact termination was not the point at all.
Rather, by noting his opposition to termination, Bruce was forecasting
changes in policy. And in the context of the times a policy change could only
mean a loss in the Bureau's regulatory abilities and a gain in the tribes' independence. In the coming months, as Bruce's intentions became clearer, the
Commissioner found himself opposed by two distinct but allied factions within
the Bureau, the Old Liners and the Hard Hats.
All bureaucracies need Old Liners just as all armies need career NCO's.
Old Liners are the doctrinaire lifers who can recognize more faults in a
bureaucratic agency than anyone on the outside, but are loyal to it nonetheless. For better or worse, they make agencies like the BIA work by applying
with annoying objectivity the dictates of the Code of Federal Regulations and
the Bureau's manuals of policy guidelines. They know that, in the absence of
proper contacts and political dexterity, imagination can be a liability in a civil
service career. Instead they prefer to take the creativity and imagination of
others and make them work, provided there are complete instructions.
5. The progress of this three-year war within the Bureau was closely covered in the dispatches
of Richard La Course and Karen Ducheneaux of the American Indian Press Association, and two
writers for the Race Relatiomr Reporter, Frye Gaillard and the author. Most of the following mate-

rial is derived from these sources.
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Old Liners shun idealism, except in the most general sense, because ideals
tend to become tinged with politics and interfere with that repetition of daily
tasks which passes for efficiency. If neither law nor bureaucratic precedent
can be applied action stops because an Old Liner would rather not act than
act in error. However, if policy conflicts with either their generalized ideals or
their expectations Old Liners have the power to subvert that policy or to undermine the actions of their superiors. And like all loyalists, Old Liners can
become confused or vengeful when those they serve do not share or respect
their fidelity.
If there is a generalized ideal in the Bureau which Old Liners have promoted to the status of doctrine, it is the ideal of merging Indians into nonIndian society with a minimum of confusion and conflict. It is tip to others to
facilitate or impede the appropriation of Indian wealth into the non-Indian
economy, and it is the Old Liners' perceived duty not to oppose these powers,
but to find ways to make them compatible with their own conception of
gradual merger. In recent years, with the Indians' emphasis on self-determination, control of resources, and tribal sovereignty, Old Liners have found
it increasingly difficult to practice their ideal or maintain a sense of professional integrity based on this two-centuries-old doctrine. It is, therefore, little
wonder that Old Liners became irritable in the face of Bruce's emphasis on
non-assimilation, self-determination, and tribal sovereignty.
But Bureau personnel is not limited to Old Liners. The Bureau has produced or acquried employees who have combined imagination and political
skill with an ability to conform or make nonconformity secretive or palatable.
To make this combination work, to parlay it into power, requires time and the
ability to survive. Those who survive in the Bureau are those who have inherited the doctrinal ideal of a bureaucrat's life. In other words, conservatives
survive safe in the knowledge that they are the experts who are more capable
of governing the people they serve than the people themselves. When this
form of institutional arrogance is added to political acumen a Hard Hat is
created.'
6. Such multi-faceted combinations are rare, but they exist and those who embody them are
truly powerful. History had no better prototype of the Hard Hat than Lord Cromer, British
Consul General in Egypt frtom 1883 to 1907. In his final sunntation, an essay entitled "The
Government of Subject Races," published one year before his death, he stated:
Cromer started by recognizing that "personal influence" without a legal or written
political treaty could be enough for "sufficiently effective supervision over public affairs"
in foreign countries. This kind of informal influence was preferable to a well-defined
policy because it could be altered at a moment's notice and (lid not necessarily involve
the home government in case of difficulties. It required a highly trained, highly reliable
staff whose loyalty and patriotism were not connected with personal ambition or vanity
and who would even be required to renounce the human aspiration of having their
name connected with their achievements. Their greatest passion would have to be for
secrecy . . . for a role behind the scenes; their greatest contempt would be directed at
publicity and people who love it.
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Like the Old Liners, Hard Hats can be highly skilled technicians servicing
the policy structure of the Bureau. But Hard Hats will always retain an undercurrent of personal amibiton, while Old Liners will always be subordinates
no matter how high in the Bureau they advance. It is that personal ambition
and the skills of promoting it that set the Hard Hats apart and enable them to
create another dimension to the Bureau's structure, one grounded in personal
power.
A Hard Hat can begin a career at the Agency level, but cannot thrive
there since the potential for power is limited and the scrutiny of a tribe can
be scathing. By the same token a Hard Hat cannot be master of the Bureau,
because the top level of Central is too exposed to the examination of the Administration, Congress, the press, and the major Indian organizations. Although they can survive and thrive in those Central Office positions ranked
just below Deputy Commissioner, they fare best in the top levels of various
field operations. That is where the Hard Hats have their jealously-guarded
power, and from where a handful of them can be as successful as a Bureau
full of Old Liners in frustrating any policy or colleague that challenges them.
Louis Bruce and his administration did exactly that.
Eight months after Bruce became Commissioner, President Nixon delivered his "self-determination without termination" policy to Congress,7 and
Bruce felt the responsibility to implement it. He assumed he had the support
of the Administration, especially Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel, who
began 1970 with an "executive realignment" in the Bureau's Central Office.
This reshuffling upgraded Bruce's authority by abolishing the posts of Deputy Commissioner and six Assistant Commissioners and replacing them with
the lower ranking positions of two Associate Commissioners and five Staff Directors. Nine months later, Hickel announced the appointment of fifteen Indians to key Bureau positions. This was the New Team who, under Bruce's
guidance, was to start changing policy. However, it soon became clear that
even Bruce's fervor for reform was lagging behind that of several New
Teamers (a group that can be called the Insurgents), who began taking over
the direction and speed of Bureau renovation. None of the New Team, particularly the Insurgents, had been made by the Bureau. Their loyalities were
toward Indian self-determination, and they had been educated in the minorCromer himself possessed all these qualities to a very high degree; his wrath was never
more strongly aroused than when he was "brought out of [his] hiding place," when "the
reality which before was only known to a few behind the scenes [became] patent to all
the world.- His pride was indeed to "remain more or less hidden [and] to pull the
strings." In exchange, and in order to make his work possible at all, the bureaucrat has
to feel safe from conirol-the praise as well as the blame, that is-of all public institutions, either Parliament . . . or the press.
H. ARENDT, sOplI note 4. at 213.
7. Nixon's Environmental Reorganization Plan, Text of Indian message, 28 Coxc. Q. 1820
(1970).
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ity movements of the 1960s and the War on Poverty. None was old enough
to have worked under the termination administrations of' Commissioners
Glenn Emmons or Phileo Nash, but they knew that no new policy had replaced that of termination. They also knew they were moving into a slightly
derelict, caretaker Bureau that was operating from issue to issue, doing
its best to prevent the worst. Reportedly, the Bureau was performing its
routine task well when they arrived; it was an Old Liner's Bureau, controlled
by the Area Directors, and as such it had no consolidated, structural ambition or reformist zeal. But 1969 was a time for zealots and the Bureau was
an anachronism.
As the struggle for a guiding policy sharpened, all issues became political
issues. Insurgents and Old Liners differed as to the means by which new
policies should be implemented, with the former advocating more direct control of programs by the tribes. The Insurgents also differed from the Hard
Hats, whose imagination and political acumen they shared, but whose control
of the Area Offices was all obstacle to the Insurgents' own political goals. As
every issue became a vehicle for political struggle each side accused the other
of being secretive, power hungry, lawless, and arbitrary. In time, it became
clear that Secretary Hickel was willing to back Commissioner Bruce and the
Insurgents against the Hard Hats. On November 24, 1970, Bruce and Hickel
announced the "Rotation Policy." 8 This policy transformed the Area Offices
into "Support Service Centers," a name almost as banal as the status enlvisioned for them. This part of the program was designed as a policy offensive in the spirit of self-determination. But rotation affected the power structure as well with its plan to transfer Area Directors from post to post in order
to break their holds on their personal constituencies. It was a program designed by the Insurgents to win the hearts and minds of the Old Liners and
reservation leaders who were known to resent the independent power of the
Hard Hats. The opposition itself was off guard and in retreat. But there was
no time for the Insurgents to capitalize on the gain, for Hickel did not remain as Secretary of Interior for long.
In the first six weeks of Rogers Morton's administration, the new Secretary
created a Management Assistance Survey Team to examine the workings of
the Bureau. He also named to his personal staff Miss Wilma Victor, a conservative, politically influential charter member of the Haskell Mafia-a closeknit contingent of Indian Old Liners who had attended Haskell, a school run
by the BIA, and who trace their standing in the Bureau back to the first
Indian preference policies of John Collier. Her elevation from head of the
education department of the Phoenix Area Office to Special Assistant to the
8.

U.S.

DEPJT OF INTERIOR, PROPOSED ClANGES IN STRUcURE

AND POICY OF THE BUREAU OF

INDIAN AFFAIRs (1971) explained the )olicy and had ata( hed a letter of policy clarification front

Commissioner B!rce to all tribes, Dec. 13, 1971.
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Secretary for Indian Affairs was an entirely gratuitous blow for the Hard
Hats.
Then in May 1971 the Management Assistance Survey Team began supplying ammunition for the Old Liners when it reported that a significant gap
had developed between Central and all field offices, and that the existing
administrative and organizational "turmoil" had been caused by attempting to
implement self-determination by decree. It added weight to the Old Liners'
charges that the Insurgents were trying to make self-determination an "event"
rather than an evolutionary process and were bending laws and issuing procedural orders that conflicted with both precedent and regulation. The Insurgents responded that if they were to comply with the Nixon antitermination policy when the regulations were designed to justify termination,
they had to do things that had never been done before. During those first
months of the Bruce administration, as journalist Frye Gaillard has written, the Insurgents did indeed institute some novel procedures:9
[F]or a while, things happened around the BIA that had never occurred before. As acting director of economic services, Leon Cook with the help of
such lieutenants as William Veeder and Phillip Corke . . . began an enthusiastic defense of Indian land and water rights. Browning Pipestem unearthed
the legal justification for a broad range of policies, including an obscure 1946
solicitor's opinion that upheld preferential hiring and promotion of Indians
within the Bureau. Ernest Stevens, as director of community services, began
revamping the BIA's urban relocation program, and Alexander McNabb
plunged into the task of negotiating self-determination contracts with various
tribes and Indian groups.
But by the summer of 1971, the anti-Insurgent opposition, smarting
under the effect of these innovations, regrouped for a counter-attack. They
were assisted by a second conservative on the Secretary's staff, William Rogers, whose promotion on June 25 from Deputy Under-secretary for Public
Land Management to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was intended to heal the factionalism in the BIA staff. The first objective of the
counter-attack was the alteration of contracting procedures.
For some time the Insurgents had been operating as if the Area Offices
had in fact become Support Service Centers. They had been by-passing them
and establishing direct links between Central and the reservations, links that
meant power was being siphoned out of the Area Offices toward the reservation, and, by implication, back toward Central as well. According to Alexander McNabb, director of operating services, from April 1970 to May of the
following year, they had tried to pump from $10 to $15 million directly into

reservation economies. Moreover, he had rewritten Bureau contracting procedures to conform with Insurgent ideals. But on June 28 McNabb was divested of contracting authority in the wake of a Government Accounting Of9.

Gaillard, Indians Demand Bureau Reform, 2

RACE RELATIONS REP.

nio. 18, at 6. 9 (1971).
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fice audit of the contracting activities which concluded that the Bureau did
not have any legislative mandate to justify either the new procedures or a
number of the contracts. In the four months following McNabb's removal, not
one new contract was negotiated out of the 119 that were pending in June,
but 93 old contracts were renegotiated. "'
One month later the counterattack produced its most substantial victory.
On July 26 Secretary Morton revived the office of Deputy Commissioner and
filled it with John 0. Crow, who had held the same post under Phileo Nash
and who had the reputation of being a tough, but progressive Haskell Mafia
Old Liner. Crow was an advocate of self-determination, who respected the
drives and talents of the Insurgents, but who also realized that none of them
had the years of Bureau experience that create an intuitive understanding
and appreciation for the unique amenities and attributes of the federal way of
life: in-house statemanship, personal obscurity and loyalty to bureauacratic
efficiency. It was to be Crow's task to give the Central Office at least the
appearance of a standard bureaucracy and, because the Old Liners were already beginning to subvert and stall, to turn Insurgent expectations and
deeds into programs compatible with the Old Liners' world view.
For this Crow was given powers equal to Bruce's in administrative
areas-i.e., the ability to direct Central Office manpower-which he first used
to demote Leon Cook, the most vocal and impatient of the Insurgents, from
Acting Director of Economic Development to Deputy Director under a nonIndian Old Liner, William Freeman. Crow then removed Ernest Stevens from
the job of Acting Associate Commissioner for Education and Programs (one of
the top four jobs in the Bureau), returned him to Director of Community
Services, and suggested abolishing the Education and Program Office. Then he
ordered William Veeder transferred to Phoenix at the request of John Artichoker, the Area Director there, and ordered Phillip Corke transferred to a
subsidiary Bureau position in Denver.
To Indians, who were already complaining about the attempts to dismantle Bruce's Bureau reforms, the Veeder transfer was the precipitating event.
On September 21 a delegation of tribal chairmen voiced their disapproval to
White House and Interior officials at a meeting in the Interior Building at
the same time that members of the American Indian Movement and the National Indian Youth Council were marching on the Bureau headquarters in
Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to make a citizen's arrest of John 0.
Crow. This combination of militant and middle-of-the-road protest did have
an impact. The Veeder and Corke transfers were rescinded and it became
obvious to everyone that another attempt would have to be made to remodel
the Central Office to make it big enough for Crow and his allies and for
Bruce and his allies.
10.

Id.
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The new reorganization which Bruce sent to Morton in October included
the appointment of Ernest Stevens as permanent Associate Commissioner for
Education and Programs and the elevation of that office to the third highest
rank in the Bureau. It also called for the abolition of the Associate Commissioner for Support Services in order to enhance McNabb's position. As a compromise, Leon Cook would not be affected by the restructuring. However,
Cook soon resigned and was elected president of the National Congress of
American Indians where he cemented an alliance between that organization
and the surviving Insurgents.
Bruce's plan, which he admitted was a compromise, was further modified
by Victor, Rogers, and Morton. By the time it was announced in December it
bore only slight resemblance to Bruce's original proposal, but it did contain a
little of something for everyone. It abolished all associate commissioner positions and replaced them with thirteen division offices, three of which were
headed by Stevens, McNabb, and their non-Indian ally Robert Gajdys. The
rest were a mixture of New Teamers and Crow supporters. However, Crow's
authority was expanded across the board to the point where he became
Bruce's equal in everything but name. It was an unwieldy structure from a
management point of view, but it was not a management-made structure-it
was a political one. And while it made for a broad, symmetrical flow chart, it
also created an unplotted picture of power that Gaillard described as the
"multiple-sandwich, squeeze-play effect."
At the top of the stack was Secretary Morton, a neutral, who could be
responsive to either side. Below Morton was Interior Under-secretary for Public Land Management, Harrison Loesch, who was no friend of Bruce or the
Insurgents. But for approval of Bureau policy or programs, it was Loesch
through whom Bruce worked, Bruce through whom Crow worked, Crow
through whom the Insurgents worked, and the Insurgents through whom the
Old Liners and Hard Hats worked. And at the base of the stack were the
reservation Indians whose expectations of the Bureau had been raised by the
Insurgency and who were putting more pressure on the Old Liners and Hard
Hats than those two factions had ever felt from below. No one rested easy for
the next eleven months and it was not the Bureau's most productive time.
Everyone was trying to engineer a new offensive.
But the final initiative did not belong to either side. It was commandeered
by the Trail of Broken Treaties Caravan and its six-day occupation of the
Central Office." When the Caravan left, it was clear that the Bureau would
never be the same. During the weeks of Central Office renovation that followed the occupation, the staff was dispersed into any federal space available,
communications faltered, and the work load piled high. The confusion was a
propaganda coup for the Hard Hats who sought permanently to discredit
I 1. See generally V. DEL

ORIA,

.JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (1974).
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Bruce and the Insurgents by charging that they were accessories to the
takeover. Authority over the Central Office fell to the receivers; partly to
Morton, but mainly to Loesch, who appointed Crow to rebuild the structure.
Crow, however, was unable to make any headway. The takeover had so
polarized the factions and crystallized the squeeze-play that any action was
impossible. Early in December, Morton gave Crow and Bruce six weeks
notice, relieved them of all authority in the Bureau and transferred the
Bureau out from under Loesch's authority. Most of the more notable combatants were swept from the Central Office. Some of the New Team stayed, as
did some of the Old Liners. Crow, Bruce, and Stevens left government service
and McNabb and Gajdys moved into the Interior Office of Management and
Budget.
Oil December 6, 1972 Morton put the Bureau under the temporary command of Richard Bodman, Assistant Interior Secretary for Management and
Budget, who was to oversee the revival of day-to-day operations and develop
the next final solution for the Central Office's structural dilemnma. Six weeks
later Bodman announced his plan to streamline the Bureau's operations by
reducing the number of Central Office divisions from thirteen to seven and
the number of Central Office positions from 1,375 to 715. It was obvious that
Secretary Morton was taking control of Indian Affairs and was using Bodman, the management technician, to de-politicize the Bureau and make it
conform to Interior's expectations. But Morton had not counted on the
strength remaining in the factions, or the influence McNabb and Gajdys
would have with Bodman and his successors in the Office of Management
and Budget, or the influence the Hard Hat-Old Line axis would have with
Marvin Franklin, whom Morton appointed, on February 7, 1973, as Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs with duties as acting Commissioner.
Franklin made two notable changes in Bodman's reorganization plan.
First, he reduced the number of Central divisions from seven to six. The
heads of each division were, together with the Commissioner, to act as the
Bureau's governing board. The Commissioner was to preside over meetings
but, like the other members, had only one vote in policy decisions. Second,
Franklin created, as an adjunct to the Commissioner's office, a new advisory
panel, the Committee on Field and Internal Operations. It soon became apparent that through this new structure Franklin was once again placing the
Bureau's reliance on the expert's experts, the conservative and politically
astute Hard Hats.
Franklin appointed as acting heads of the six divisions leading Old Liners,
most of whom had been detailed into the Central Office from permanent
assignments as Assistant Area Directors. Next he filled the Committee on
Field and Internal Operations with a majority of Area Directors, including the
leading Hard Hats. In theory the Committee was merely an advisory board
whose sole responsibility was to meet monthly with Franklin for consultation
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on policy matters. But under Franklin, as so often in the past, governing
boards may not do all of the governing and the advisory board may do more
than merely advise.
The actual structure became somewhat clearer on April 10 when Franklin
issued his major organizational memo. Part of it was commonplace, like the
admonition that "the control of power is the control of money and manpower. ' 12 The memo then explained that bureaucratic control would follow
the line set out in the new organizational chart: from Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner to Area Directors to Agency Superintendents. However, such a plan is only as plausible as the flow chart is dependable. And
Franklin weakened the dependability of the flow chart by doubling back and
writing: "The management concepts that are required represent changes in
the roles of the Central Office staff. Those offices must carry out policy established by line authority."'1 3 But since the key members of the Central Office
staff-the six acting division heads-were on leave from positions as Assistant
Area Directors-and still consulted monthly with their superiors in the
field-the governing board members effectively remained subordinates of the
Hard Hat Area Directors. Formally and informally it made for some strange
structural geometry, a circuitous and discreet way for the Area Directors,
through intermediaries and superiors, to tell themselves and the Bureau what
to do.
If the structure had been allowed to stand it would have been a total Hard
Hat victory, but it would not have been a total return to a pre-Bruce Bureau.
The Bruce Administration was the soundest evidence yet that undeniable
change had occurred in Indian Country and Congress. It was obvious that the
concept of self-determination, though frustrated by the war in Central, was a
policy taken for granted on most reservations. It would soon be given legislative effect in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. 14
But who would turn the relatively few pages of the Self-Determination and
Education Act into regulations, and who would revise the BIA manuals to
reflect the law? What remained of Insurgent strength foresaw the possibility
that under Franklin those jobs would fall to the Old Liners who would act on
the advice and consent of the Hard Hats. The Insurgents were fearful that
such an axis could regulate self-determination to its own advantage in the
same way that that axis had accused the Insurgents of using selfdetermination to their own advantage, and, more to the point, in the same
way that the axis had subverted Collier's concept by transforming Area Offices from intermediate service centers into inscrutable and powerful miniature Central Offices.
12. National Congress of American Indians, Synopsis of the National Consultation on BIA
Delivery Systems, Denver, Sept. 14-15, 1973 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
13. id.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (Snpp. 1976).
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But the structure was not allowed to stand, for it soon encountered opposition from two fronts. Publicly, Franklin's realignment was attacked during
the summer of 1973 by the National Congress of American Indians and its
closest congressional ally, Senator James Abourezk, who requested that
Morton once again take charge of the Bureau. Franklin, they charged, was
acting "illegally" because he had gone without Senate confirmation longer
than the law allowed. At the same time, but behind the scenes, Franklin was
also drawing fire from another study group created by Interior Secretary
Morton called the Committee on Bureau Reorganization. This committee included Franklin, Interior Solicitor Kent Frizzell, Assistant Interior Secretary
for Program Development Larry Lynn, and Assistant Interior Secretary for
Management James Clark. The majority of these men wanted Franklin to stop
the realignment for the ostensible reason that its field research group had not
completed a report on how reservation Indians thought the Bureau should be
structured. That was probably only part of their reason; when the report appeared late that fall stating that Indians wanted a Bruce-like structure, the
entire matter was quietly swept under the rug. A more plausible reason for
the committee's opposition was that it reflected the attitude of the Interior
Department, which had expected Franklin to further the Department's own
Bureau reorganization plan. Franklin, however, had listened more to the
Area Directors than he had to Interior. In August, Franklin announced that
he was stopping the implementation of his realignment and was withdrawing
his name from consideration as Commissioner. In his written announcement
to Interior Undersecretary John Whittaker, Franklin broadly implied that he
had been undercut by the Administration.
Interior's plan for the Bureau was never articulated publicly, but in July
1973, an issue arose that gave the plan some definition besides adding spice
and confusion to the summer's hostilities. During that month John Sidle,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Development, authored an "administratively confidential" memo to Undersecretary Whittaker, who was then the
intermediary between Secretary Morton and the Bureau. The memo began:
"During our conversation of June 15 you [Whittaker] questioned the need for
and desirability of having BIA Area Directors.""5 Sidle then agreed that the
question had merit and posed two alternatives to the structure: replace the
directors with "new, young management" or "reorganize the Area Offices out
of existence" and place their duties in Federal Regional Councils.
Sidle went on to argue against replacement on the gr6unds that Bruce's
rotation policy had failed to shake the power of the Area Directors and cited,
for additional proof, instances in which Oklahoma Representative Carl Albert
and Montana Senators Metcalf and Mansfield had intervened to prevent the
15. American Indian Press Ass'n News Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1973, in which the Sidle Memo was
printed in full.
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transfer of Area Directors out of their respective states. The best option in
Sidle's opinion was the abolition of the Area Offices. In this regard the memo
had been heavily influenced by two of Sidle's subordinates, Insurgents
McNabb and Gajdys. Sidle even reminded Whittaker that McNabb had once
briefed him on the "effectiveness of the various Area Directors."
Sidle concluded with the belief that Whittaker and others in Interior could
probably gather support from the National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI) and the National Indian Youth Council for his "regionalization" plan.
But here he was in error because he had not counted on the total distrust
some Insurgents, including those closely associated with NCAI, had for
Nixon's New Federalism Doctrine, of which the Federal Regional Councils
were a part. They felt that any dispersal of power out of the BIA would only
cripple the Bureau's integrity, and thus the integrity of the unique Indianfederal government relationship that lies at the heart of all attempts toward
self-determination, sovereignty, and trust protection. NCAI lobbied this point
with Franklin's Old Line division heads, who agreed. Sidle was also unaware
that after leaving the Bureau the Insurgents were slightly divided over the
question of Bureau integrity. One side, those who opposed Sidle, wanted all
Bureau power put back into the Central Office in the hope that someday the
Bureau could be transformed into a Super Bureau, an independent public
corporation that could provide services to reservations and be governed by
the people it served. But the other side, those who backed Sidle, wanted a
gradual dispersal of Bureau service programs into those agencies of the government established specifically for service: Indian Education would follow
Indian Health into HEW, Indian Housing would move into HUD, and manpower development would move into the Labor Department. In other words,
the plan was to kill the Bureau through gradual evisceration. This, of course,
would be contingent on the creation of the Indian Trust Council Authority, a
legislative proposal that seeks to establish an independent legal commission
6
which would protect tribal governmental sovereignty and the trust status.1
Regionalization, then, created a new and somewhat bewildering line-up of
allies. The anti-regionalists were the Old Line-Hard Hat Axis and one faction
of the Insurgency. The regionalists were the other side of the Insurgency and
the top officials of the Interior Department. Each had its share of grass roots
support. And each, except the Old Line-Hard Hat Axis, was opposed to
Franklin on the issue of realignment. However, on the issue of regionalization, Franklin seemed to be in everybody's camp. Although he had championed the Area Director's return to power, Franklin stated in an interview
in November 1973 that placing the functions of the Area Offices in Federal
7
Regional Councils was a logical extension of the realignment policy.1
16.

S. 1339, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).

17.

Nickeson, Paternalism and ItsMates, 5 RACE RELATIONS REP. no. 5, at 22 (1974).
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The hostilities suddenly ceased in December 1973 when Morris Thompson
was confirmed as Indian Commissioner. There were several reasons for this
cessation, but only two were apparent at the time. First, commissioners, like
presidents, are given a honeymoon period with the Bureau while their staffs
are selected and their intentions become clear. Thompson's honeymoon was a
long one because his staff selection seemed interminable, and as his people
began to fall into place no definite Central Office characteristic developed as
it had in the two previous administrations. Secondly, Thompson opened the
doors of the Central Office to everyone who had complained that either
Bruce or Franklin had excluded them. Both of these factors had a cooling
effect.
Only later did it become clear that during these initial months the present
organization of the Bureau was taking shape almost unnoticed. Currently, the
visible structure under Thompson is a modified version of Franklin's modifications of the Bodman plan. The only major changes have been the abolition
of the Committee on Field and Internal Operations, and the removal of the
Office of Public Affairs, one of the six divisions under Franklin, from what
could be called the Program Line and its incorporation into the Commissioner's own staff. But more significantly, Thompson's Central Office is
largely a de-politicized one, a fact that pleases Interior, which in the past
two years has made inroads into policy making, primarily through the Interior Solicitor's office. There is now in Central a sprinkling of Old Liners, an
Insurgency flavor here and there, and a couple of small power domains that
appear to be personal and free of the partisanship that so characterized the
two previous administrations. But there are no visible Hard Hats. They and
their closest Old Line associates have left the Central Office and have once
again entrenched themselves in the Area Offices. Although the power to decide policy formally resides in the Central Office, the actual administration of
programs is largely in the hands of the Area Directors. Powers delegated by
the Secretary to the Commissioner have effectively been redelegated to the
Area Directors and their subordinates. The process merely institutionalizes
what has existed since Franklin's organizational memo. The Area Offices have
been given the responsibility of administration and control of almost all
Bureau programs. Through their control of money and manpower they
maintain substantial control of policy, for it would be impossible for the Central Office to ignore or slight in the least the stated expectations of those who
are administering the programs for which Central is establishing policy. However, there are indications that the Area Offices have never regained their old
prominance, but were also weakened during the five year war. The composite
losses of the opposition were never translated directly into Area Office gains;
the war had a degenerating effect on all of its participants. For example, several of the Area Offices have gone without permanent directors for months, a
situation that resulted in a suit being filed recently against the Department of
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Interior by tribes in the Albuquerque area.18 In another instance, some
Dakota tribes petitioned for the closure of the Aberdeen Area Office late in
1974, and Central appeared willing to follow those wishes had there been
unanimity among the tribes in the area. There also have been a number of
management complaints that the Area Offices have become little more than
duplicate and expensive bottlenecks in the day-to-day processing of Bureau
work. For this reason the Area Offices have been required to bear an unequal
share in Interior's efforts to reduce its overall work force. In other words, the
Area Offices and their power are no longer being taken for granted, the
worst setback a sub-institution of the self-made type can suffer.
When taken as a whole, the greatest accomplishment of the entire structural war was an acceleration of entropy. When the war began all the energies
were directed toward reforming the relationships between the Bureau and its
constituency. But it soon became apparent that such reform was totally contingent upon a reformation within the structural sphere of the Bureau. Yet
when pulled into this sphere, where the constituency is secondary, the action
suddenly became almost a conflict over structure for its own sake, fought as if
structure had far more causal capabilities than it can claim in reality. From
this point there was no other way for the war to go except toward a degrading of energies from a concrete level to increasingly abstract ones. The final
realignmentlregionalization controversy was little more than a decadent
parody of the action that touched off the war. The chronology of the war
indicates that the deeper the action went into structure the closer it came to a
dead end, because structure is an end. Structure is the cause of little, but the
effect of much: It is a temporary manifestation of the interplay between policy and power. In the long run it will make little difference whether the
Bureau takes on the form of Amtrac and the TVA, or dissolves into the total
federal network. If the elements of policy and power remain unchanged, the
Bureau will still be the Bureau (or Bureaus, as the case might be). Such has
always been the case. Despite the six structural changes that the Bureau has
undergone in the past six years-despite all past changes-the Bureau has
remained essentially unchanged since 1824, because Indian policy and the
powers that implement it have changed only in their complexity since John
Cabot put Britain's Christian claim on North America in 1497.
As the Indian Policy Review Commission reexamines the formal organization of the Bureau, it might best look at it for what it is-a costume of
changeable style in which the Bureau chooses to dress to go to work. Obviously, it is not enough to consider style; the effort must be placed on the
substance behind it. In this light it might be best for the recommendations
concerning the structure of the BIA to be the last that unfold from the
Commission as it works out its own style for countering that of the status quo.
18.

Pueblo of Acoma v. Hathaway, Civil No. 75-419 (D.N.M., filed July' 16, 1975).

